We investigate the spatial distribution and organization of an imperfectly competitive industry when Þrms may choose to operate more than a single production unit. Focusing on a short-run setting with a Þxed mass of Þrms, we fully characterize the spatial equilibria analytically. Comparing the equilibrium and the Þrst-best, we show that both organizational and spatial inefficiencies may arise. In particular, when Þxed costs are low enough the market outcome may well lead to overinvestment and, therefore, to too many multinationals operating from a social point of view. Furthermore, once multinationals are taken into account, the market outcome may well lead too little agglomeration.
Introduction
It is fair to say that multinational enterprises (henceforth, MNEs) are key players in the world economy and that their importance has been increasing recently. Indeed, estimates suggest that MNEs may be responsible for as much as 75% of world commodity trade and that they account for the major share of intra-industry trade, itself a large part of world trade (see Dunning, 1993 ; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Recently, inward and outward foreign direct investment (henceforth, FDI) for the OECD countries amounted to USD 384.4 billion and 576.3 billion in 2003, respectively (OECD, 2004 ). Yet, despite their importance in shaping the international economy and the structure of world trade, the desirability of multinational Þrms is a much less debated topic. As Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, pp. IX and 1) put it:
"Depending on your point of view, multinational enterprises are either the heroes or the villains of the globalized economy [. . . ] The Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde perception of MNEs stems more from the ambiguous feelings often directed towards large market players with no national identity than from rigorous economic analysis. Indeed, the debate on MNEs is rarely grounded in economic arguments and there is little understanding of what MNEs are, and what the sound reasons for liking or disliking them are."
In the present paper, we develop a simple model of horizontal FDI in the presence of product differentiation, imperfect competition, trade costs, and size asymmetries between countries. In so doing, we tie more closely together two quite distinct strands of the literature on multinational Þrms, namely the one analyzing the location and production decisions of a single Þrm using a quasi-linear quadratic speciÞcation, which allows to get concise analytical results (e.g., Haußer and Wooton, 1999; Haaland and Wooton, 2000) ; and the one focusing on differentiated products and the interaction of a large number of Þrms within an industry (e.g., Venables, 1998, 2000 ; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Our model combines both approaches in a concise way, provides a full analytical characterization of the equilibria, and compares the market outcome with the optimum. 1 Our 1 Note that our analysis is static and, therefore, disregards all 'dynamic' gains from FDI, e.g., technology transfer or increases in productivity. Yet, these gains may be quite signiÞcant (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). We also neglect the presence of communication costs between headquarters and production plants, and the impacts of changes in these on the production organization of the industry (see, e.g., Fujita and Thisse, 2005) .
results conÞrm the (mostly numerical) Þndings derived by Venables (1998, 2000) , Raybaudi-Massilia (2000) and Ekholm and Forslid (2001) , which have been empirically highlighted by Brainard (1997) , using an alternative modelling framework: 2 larger market size, more symmetric countries, higher trade costs, and lower Þxed costs for establishing a foreign subsidiary all raise the occurrence of MNEs in equilibrium, whereas smaller market size, asymmetric countries, lower trade costs and higher Þxed costs raise the occurrence of exporters. When Þxed costs are either high or low, the spatial equilibrium involves only exporters or only multinationals, respectively; whereas for intermediate values of Þxed costs all types of Þrms may coexist in both countries. Finally, when all types of Þrms coexist, the exporting Þrms are located mainly in the larger country because market size matters in the presence of increasing returns and transport costs. Yet, the so-called 'home market effect' (henceforth, HME; Krugman, 1980; Helpman and Krugman, 1985) , namely that Þrms locate disproportionately in the larger country which becomes a net exporter of the goods produced under increasing returns, need not arise in the presence of MNEs. The reason for this is that trade and horizontal FDI are substitutes, which reduces trade ßows and therefore provides a potential explanation of why the HME may be difficult to Þnd in international trade data (see, e.g., Davis and Weinstein, 2003; Head and Ries, 2003) .
Turning to the normative analysis of MNEs, our main result shows that there are two potential inefficiencies in the space-economy. First, too many exporting Þrms are generally clustered into the larger country, i.e., there is too much agglomeration in equilibrium . Second, the presence of multinationals may lead to organizational inefficiencies in the sense that there can be either over-or under-investment in production plants. In particular, when the Þxed costs for establishing a second plant are low enough, too many Þrms may 'go multinational'. The reason underlying this result is that a larger number of MNEs increases competition and decreases prices in the global economy, which makes market access for exporting Þrms more difficult when compared to local sales of MNEs. Thus, even more Þrms will decide to 'go multinational' since exporting is not the best option. In such a case, the resource waste of establishing a second plant may well not be compensated by sufficient transport cost savings. It 2 Markusen and Venables (1998) focus on homogeneous goods and quantity competition, whereas our model includes differentiated goods and price competition. Ekholm and Forslid (2001) assume perfect labor mobility, whereas our model assumes immobile labor. Finally, Raybaudi-Massilia (2000) presents a model with immobile labor, but she restricts her attention to simulation results.
is of interest to note that this result contrasts starkly with what is known in the alternative CES setting, in which there is always under-investment with respect to the Þrst-best due to the absence of pro-competitive effects (Toulemonde, 2004) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and derive the market outcome. Section 3 discusses the spatial equilibrium. Sections 4 investigates the optimal outcome and Section 5 compares it with the equilibrium. Section 6 discusses our results and investigates their robustness under alternative modeling assumptions. Section 7 concludes and points towards future research directions.
The model
Our model extends the framework of and Thisse (2002, 2004) to include multinational Þrms. In this section, we develop the basic model and characterize the market outcome for any given organizational structure and spatial distribution of Þrms.
Preferences
Consider a world with two countries, labeled H and F . Variables associated with each country will be subscripted accordingly. We assume that there is a mass L of consumers, with a share 1/2 < θ < 1 located in country H. In what follows, we refer to H as the 'large' country. All consumers in countries i = H, F have identical quasi-linear preferences over a homogeneous good and a continuum of N varieties of a horizontally differentiated good. The subutility over the varieties v ∈ [0, N] of the manufactured good is quadratic:
where q i (v) denotes the consumption of variety v, q o i stands for the consumption of the homogeneous good, and where α > 0, β > γ > 0 are utility parameters.
All consumers are endowed with one unit of labor, K/L units of capital, and q o > 0 units of the homogeneous good. Both labor and capital are supplied inelastically. The homogeneous good is produced under perfect competition using one unit of labor only, and we assume that the homogenous good can be costlessly traded between countries. Hence we can choose the latter as the numéraire, i.e., p o i = p o = 1. Each agent maximizes her utility (1) subject to her budget constraint:
where p i (v) is the consumer price of variety v, w i is the wage and r i is the rental rate of capital that an individual in country i faces. As in , we assume that the endowment of the homogenous good q o is large enough for agents to consume this good in equilibrium (q o i > 0). As a result, the demands for the differentiated goods include no income effects. In particular, the allocation of proÞts to shareholders and the location where these proÞts are generated are immaterial for the consumption of the differentiated good. Maximizing the utility (1) subject to (2), we obtain the following demands:
where a, b and c are positive coefficients given by
Technology, trade costs, and factor mobility
We assume that each manufacturing Þrm v ∈ [0, N] produces a single variety, e.g., because of a patent right or the absence of scope economies. Hence, the total mass of varieties N also stands for the total mass of Þrms in the global economy. Firms not only choose their location but also choose the number of plants they operate: either a single plant only, or one plant in each of the two countries. Stated differently, Þrms make both an organizational and a locational choice in our model since they decide whether they will be singleor multi-plant. 3 We denote by n i the mass of single-plant Þrms based in country i = H, F , and by m the mass of multi-plant Þrms, respectively. 4 The total mass of varieties and, therefore, of Þrms is given by
Given the fact that MNEs operate two plants, the mass of production plants is then given by n H + n F + 2m ≥ N. The demand for each variety depends on the mass of varieties produced domestically and on the mass produced abroad. The mass of varieties produced in country H (resp., in country F ) is equal to N H = n H + m (resp., N F = n F + m). As will become clear later, the mass of varieties imported from country F (resp., from country H) is equal to n F (resp., n H ) because local production and imports of the same variety do not occur in equilibrium.
Labor is assumed to be internationally immobile but perfectly mobile across sectors. As usual in the literature, we assume unit labor productivity in the perfectly competitive and costlessly tradable numéraire sector which, by arbitrage, yields a unit wage w i = 1 for all workers in both countries. In the differentiated goods sector, all manufacturing Þrms have identical production functions which involve Þxed and variable costs incurred in capital and in labor, respectively. On the one hand, the variable labor requirement can be normalized to zero without loss of generality. Indeed, as mentioned by , a change in variable cost is equivalent to a rescaling of consumers' demand intercepts. On the other hand, each Þrm's Þxed cost depends on the number of plants it operates. A Þrm requires f units of capital to set up its primary production plant, and ξf additional units of capital to set up a secondary production plant in the other country. When 0 < ξ < 1, there exist Þrm-level scale economies since the Þxed costs of the second plant are smaller than those of the Þrst one. This may capture the fact that a share (1 − ξ)f of capital is required for R&D or general management, whereas only ξf units are used for production per se. By contrast, when ξ > 1 there exist Þrm-level scale diseconomies. This may reßect the additional coordination, control and management costs (overhead costs) created by distant business units. In the main part of the paper we assume that the rental rate of capital is exogenously Þxed and, without loss of generality., we normalize it to one: r i ≡ r = 1, i ∈ {H, F }. Constant rental rates may reßect a constant degree of lenders' rate of intertemporal substitution, or they may result from the fact that the industry is small when compared to the rest of the economy (because either countries or industries are small enough). The capital supply is then inÞnitely elastic, which implies that the mass of Þrms and varieties is constant and equal to N. In Section 6, we relax this assumption by considering less elastic supplies of capital which leads to a variable mass of Þrms. Finally, shipping each variety of the manufactured good across countries entails a per-unit cost of τ > 0 units of the numéraire, whereas shipping it within each country is free.
Given the set of assumptions outlined in the above, Þrms play the following two-stage game: (i) all Þrms simultaneously choose the number and location of their production plants; and (ii) given their previous choices, all Þrms set proÞt maximizing prices in each market separately. We derive the price equilibrium of the second stage in the next sub-section and then present Þrms' locational and organizational choices in Section 3.
Price equilibrium
Assume that n H , n F and m are given. Because all varieties produced in the same country may be treated symmetrically, the demands for varieties produced in country i and consumed in country j can be expressed as follows:
Since each Þrm is negligible, it sets its own prices taking as given all other variables. In accord with empirical evidence (e.g., Head and Mayer, 2000; Haskel and Wolf, 2001), we assume that markets are segmented. Firms are hence free to set prices speciÞc to each national market they sell their product in. Superscripting variables pertaining to single-plant Þrms by s and to multi-plant Þrms by m, the proÞt of a single-plant Þrm established in country H is given by
whereas the proÞt of a multi-plant Þrms is given by
To shorten exposition, we derive all expressions for country-H Þrms only, symmetric expressions holding for country-F Þrms. As can be seen from (4) and (5), we assume that multi-plant Þrms behave like local Þrms in each domestic market and serve each market through 'subsidiary sales' only. Indeed, given plant-level scale economies, transport costs, and the absence of capacity constraints, the Þrm will never produce a fraction of demand locally while importing the rest from abroad. Since multi-plant Þrms serve each market locally, their domestic pricing decisions are identical to those of the single-plant Þrms operating in the same market. Maximizing the proÞts (4) and (5) with respect to p HH and p HF , substituting the price aggregate and solving for the equilibrium prices and quantities yields:
As can be seen from (6), both p * HH and p * F H decrease with the mass of plants located in country H, i.e., m + n H . Note that the mass of multiplant Þrms inßuences all equilibrium prices. Hence, whereas single-plant Þrms have an impact only on the prices in the country they are located in, multi-plant Þrms put a downward pressure on prices in both countries. As a result, when τ > 0 an increase in the number of multi-plant Þrms raises competition everywhere and reduces proÞts in both countries.
In what follows, we assume that trade costs are sufficiently low such that international trade is always feasible. It is readily veriÞed that q * ij > 0 for all (n i , n j , m) and i 6 = j provided that
Condition (8), which is henceforth referred to as trade feasibility condition, also makes sure that export prices p * ij net of transport costs τ remain strictly positive for all Þrm distributions. For the sake of simplicity, we furthermore assume that all varieties are produced in equilibrium. To this aim we assume that a single-plant Þrm can always proÞtably operate in its local market for all possible values of trade costs τ and all spatial and organizational structures of the economy. Using the most restrictive case where all Þrms are multi-plant and where τ = τ trade , this will be the case when
Condition (9), which is henceforth referred to as Þrms' proÞtability constraint makes sure that all types of Þrms always make positive proÞts for all possible structures of the economy. Note that we can always set a sufficiently high value of L to satisfy this constraint. Using expression (7) the proÞts of single-and multi-plant Þrms can Þnally be expressed as follows:
Spatial equilibrium
All Þrms simultaneously choose their production location and structure. Let us Þrst focus on single-plant Þrms (m = 0). Evaluating the difference of single-plant Þrms' proÞts at the equilibrium prices (6) and quantities (7) yields the following proÞt differential:
where
Equating this proÞt differential to zero, we readily obtain the mass of Þrms in countries H and F :
which corresponds to the expressions of Ottaviano and Thisse (2004) . Suppose now that Þrms may choose to run several production plants. Expression (10) is an equilibrium if and only if no single-plant Þrm can proÞtably invest abroad, which implies to evaluate the difference between multi-plant and single-plant Þrms' proÞts
To ease the exposition, let us deÞne
and
which are all positive coefficients under the trade feasibility condition (8) . It is readily veriÞed that A H < A F < A 0 for all θ < θ, whereas A H < A 0 < A F when θ > θ.
Using (6) and (7), some standard calculations show that (11) is positive if and only if
The analogous condition for country
Finally, on can verify that n * H < n H if and only if ξf > A 0 . Expression (12) shows that single-plant Þrms in country H decide to become multi-plant when the mass of single-plant Þrms located there exceeds the critical mass n H . Stated differently, Þrms are enticed to become multiplant if they are located in a country hosting many Þrms.
Because θ > 1/2 we have that n H > n F . Firms in the larger country have indeed 'less incentives' to become multi-plant because they serve the larger share of demand locally. A direct consequence of the size asymmetries between countries is that we may observe asymmetric situations, in which only exporting Þrms located in the smaller country decide to open a second production plant in the larger foreign market. Note also that n H and n F can be positive or negative, depending on the relative size of ξ, τ and θ.
Conditions (12) and (13) illustrate several important aspects. First, if ξ is sufficiently small (i.e., plant-level scale economies are small when compared to Þrm-level scale economies), Þrms will always want to run a second production plant. The same occurs of course when transport costs τ are sufficiently large, provided that trade remains feasible. Second, when demand (a and L) in the global economy is sufficiently large, Þrms will also become multi-plant since they would incur more (overall) transport costs otherwise. All these results are in accord with what is known in the case of horizontal FDI (Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004).
Equilibrium
Since the equilibrium conÞgurations depend on ξf and θ, our results are best conveyed using a graphical representation as in Figures 1 and 2 . A formal description of the equilibria, including all proofs, are given in Appendix A.
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2
The equilibrium location and structure of Þrms requires to distinguish between several cases, depending on how ξf compares to the thresholds A H , A F and A 0 . Figure 1 depicts the spatial equilibrium as a function of the capital requirement ξf for a second plant when size asymmetries between countries are small (i.e., θ < θ). 5 The heights between two curves represent the number of Þrms in each conÞguration, which are all linear functions of ξf . As can be seen, when ξf ≤ A H , there are only multi-plant Þrms. This is because the cost of a second plant is low enough so that exporting is never an optimal choice. When A H < ξf < A F , exporting becomes a viable option and some Þrms start shutting-down plants in the small country F and relocate all their production activity to the large country H. The equilibrium involves both single-and multi-plant Þrms but single-plant Þrms agglomerate in the larger country. As the cost of a second plant increases further (A F < ξf < A 0 ), more and more Þrms turn to an export-oriented production structure. The equilibrium involves both single-and multi-plant Þrms and single-plant Þrms unequally disperse across both countries. Finally, when the cost of a second plant becomes too large (ξf > A 0 ), multi-plant operation is no longer feasible and there are only exporting Þrms. In that case, the larger country H hosts a more than proportionate share of the Þrms. Indeed, single-plant Þrms locate in the larger country because of the HME which makes them serve the larger fraction of their demand locally.
Until now, we have assumed that the size asymmetries between countries are sufficiently small (θ < θ). As θ gradually increases, the zone for a pure multi-plant conÞguration shrinks, whereas the occurence of an interior equilibrium decreases (the slopes in the middle part of Figure 1 become steeper). Once countries differ sufficiently (i.e., θ ≥ θ), there are no more equilibria in which both single-and multi-plant Þrms coexist. In that case, which is depicted by Figure 2 , all Þrms are multi-plant when the costs of a second plant are low enough (ξf < A H ), whereas all Þrms will be single-plant exporters located in the large country H when plant costs are high enough (ξf ≥ A H ). Stated differently, as plant costs rise, the location structure discontinuously switches from a pure multi-plant situation with full dispersion of production to a pure single-plant situation with full agglomeration of production. The reason for such a change is that the agglomeration forces generated by the larger region are too strong to make production proÞtable in the smaller country. As a consequence, all Þrms will cluster into the large country once the Þxed costs of a second plant are sufficiently low.
Comparative statics
Figures 1 and 2 can easily be used to present some comparative static results with respect to the size of demand, transport costs, and plant-level Þxed costs. Indeed, all the thresholds A H , A F and A 0 increase in the size of demand (a and L), decrease in demand elasticity (smaller b) and increase in transport cost (τ ). Hence, increases in demand or transport costs, or decreases in the demand elasticity are mathematically equivalent to a reduction of ξf, thus raising the likelihood of Þrms becoming multi-plant. Intermediate values of demand and transport costs give rise to either agglomeration in the larger country or to equilibria with all types of Þrms.
Our results also neatly illustrate how size asymmetries matter for multiplant Þrms. Figure 3 displays the equilibrium conÞgurations for various
The labels in each area denote the types of Þrms that are active at the equilibrium. For instance, n H means that the equilibrium includes only single-plant Þrms in country H. Figure 3 shows that the absolute and relative sizes of regions are two important determinants of industry structure. First, when the absolute country sizes are large, the equilibrium involves only multi-plant Þrms, whatever agglomeration forces may exist. The reason for this is that, by running two plants, Þrms avoid transport costs on large bulks of exports when both countries are large. Relative size asymmetries have no impact on the distribution of Þrms and plants. Second, when absolute country sizes are small, relative sizes do matter for the location of economic activity. Similar country sizes imply single-plant Þrms in both countries, whereas size differences push Þrms to locate in the larger country only. Finally, when absolute country sizes take intermediate values, an increase in the relative size of the larger country Þrstly decreases the number of single-plant Þrms in the smaller country and then reduces the number of Þrms building a second plant in this country. This suggests, as in Markusen and Venables (1998) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, ch.3), that multi-plant Þrms are more likely to be observed in large and symmetric countries.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE

Home market effect
It is instructive to measure to which extent the HME arises in the various conÞgurations of our model. To reduce the number of cases, we assume in what follows that θ < θ. First, consider that no Þrm decides to become multinational, which happens when the cost of a second plant is large (ξf > A 0 ). Similarly to Ottaviano and Thisse (2004) , one can then check that the HME shows up in the model in this case. Indeed, using expression (10), the 'market size bias' in the international distribution of Þrms is given by:
which is always larger than the population bias (L H − L F ) /L = 2θ − 1 by the trade feasibility condition (8) . Although Þrms relax competition by dispersing themselves across the two countries, they minimize transport costs by locating production in the larger country where they can serve the larger demand locally. In equilibrium, these two forces must be balanced so that the larger country hosts a more than proportional share of the industry. Does the home market effect still arise in the presence of multi-plant Þrms? Consider now the equilibria involving both single-and multi-plant Þrms in every country (A F ≤ ξf ≤ A 0 ). As shown in Appendix A, the spatial equilibrium is such that n * H = n H and n * F = n F , so that the market size bias in the international distribution of Þrms is equal to
It can be veriÞed that this expression is smaller than (14) whenever A 0 < ξf, a condition that must hold for multi-plant Þrms to operate. As a result, the HME gets weaker in the presence of multi-plant Þrms than in their absence. Moreover, one can check when a HME arises in the conÞguration with multi-plant Þrms. It is readily veriÞed that country H hosts a more than proportional industry share if and only if
This will not be the case (i) if countries' size asymmetries are small; or (ii) if the costs ξf of a second plant are low; or (iii) if transport costs τ and the mass L of population are large. Stated differently, the HME may vanish in the presence of multi-plant Þrms, which may be one cause for the relative absence of 'home market effects' in the international trade data.
We now compare the equilibrium location and organizational structure to the (Þrst-best) optimum location and structures. 6 
Optimum
In this section, we analyze whether the presence of MNEs is desirable from a global perspective. In doing so, we want to assess whether the global economy as a whole may beneÞt or loose from the presence of MNEs. Note that we do not investigate whether some countries may gain whereas others may loose, which is an important issue abundantly discussed elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Markusen and Venables, 1999; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004).
The quasi-linear setup of our model is well suited to a full-ßedged utilitarian welfare analysis, since utilities are transferrable. In the Þrst-best, the planner is able to monitor Þrms' location, organizational structure, and prices. The planner equates prices to marginal costs, i.e., p HH = p F F = 0 and p HF = p F H = τ , and uses lump-sum transfers to compensate Þrms for the losses they incur under such a pricing policy. The planner thus maximizes the aggregate welfare which includes the total consumer surplus minus the total (Þxed) cost of production:
One can show that the consumer surplus in country H is given by
which reduces to
under marginal cost pricing. A symmetric expression holds for country F . A Þrst-best allocation is then a triple (n • H , n • F , m • ) that maximizes the aggregate welfare W , subject to the constraints m
To ease the exposition, let
and deÞne the following four thresholds:
which play an analoguous role to the thresholds in the previous section. It is readily veriÞed that B 1 > B H , B F > B H and B 0 > B H for all parameter values of the model. Furthermore, θ • > θ. As in Section 3, the basic results concerning the Þrst-best location and structure of Þrms are best conveyed graphically. The formal descriptions and proofs are relegated to Appendix B. 7 
INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5
Figures 4 and 5 depict the Þrst-best masses of multi-and single-plant Þrms, which are again linear functions of ξf. As the reader can observe, the 'ranking' of the Þrst-best conÞgurations is very similar to the 'ranking' of equilibrium conÞgurations as ξf changes: only multi-plant Þrms are chosen when ξf is sufficiently low, whereas we gradually switch to a pure singleplant conÞguration as ξf progressively increases. More speciÞcally, when the size asymmetries are small enough as in Figure 4 (θ < θ • ), the planner organizes production as follows: (i) only multi-plant Þrms for ξf < B H ; (ii) multi-plant Þrms and single-plant Þrms in the larger country for B H < ξf ≤ B F ; and (iii) multi-plant Þrms and single-plant Þrms in every country if B F < ξf ≤ B 0 ; and (iv) only single-plant Þrms for ξf > B 0 . Ottaviano and Thisse (2002) discuss the case of single-plant Þrms and point out that the planner tends to allocate less single-plant Þrms to the larger country in order to reduce spatial inequalities. In that case, the market outcome usually provides too much agglomeration.
When size asymmetries are large as in Figure 5 (θ ≥ θ • ), the planner organizes production in a quite similar way. Yet, there is a major difference with respect to the market outcome, since there are conÞgurations in which multi-and single-plant Þrms coexist. Hence, the planner may chose to retain some single-plant Þrms in both, whereas this never happens in equilibrium when θ > θ. Stated differently, spatial inequalities are again reduced but there is still some form of agglomeration.
Comparative statics results on the Þrst-best are also similar to those on the equilibrium as all the B thresholds increase in a, L and τ and decrease in b. Hence, increases in demand or transport costs, or decreases in the demand elasticity, are mathematically equivalent to a reduction of ξf, thus raising the likelihood that the planner implements a production structure with multi-plant Þrms.
Is there a HME in the Þrst-best? Focussing again on the case where θ < θ, conÞgurations with only single plant Þrms (ξf > B 0 ) yield the following market size bias in the international distribution of Þrms (see Appendix B):
It is readily veriÞed that this bias exceeds (2θ −1) under the trade feasibility condition. By contrast, conÞgurations with multi-and single-plant Þrms located in both countries (B F < ξf ≤ B 0 ) yield a market size bias in the international distribution of Þrms equal to
which depends on the cost of a second plant. Hence, there exist parameter values such that this bias is smaller than its equilibrium counterpart when there are only single-plant Þrms, thus showing again that the HME gets weaker or may be reversed in the presence of multinationals.
Too many or too few multi-plant Þrms?
Contrary to models with only single-plant Þrms, two types of inefficiencies may arise in the presence of multi-plant Þrms. First, there may be organizational inefficiencies, in the sense that Þrms do not choose to operate the socially efficient number of plants. Second, there may be spatial inefÞciencies, in the sense that Þrms do not locate their production units in a socially efficient way. Whereas the second inefficiency has been repeatedly highlighted in economic geography Baldwin et al., 2003 ) the Þrst has not been much investigated until now. We can establish the following proposition concerning the equilibrium and optimum number of MNEs. Let us deÞne S * as the set of parameters ξf such that, compared to the Þrst best, too few Þrms decide to become multiplant (under-investment in plants, m * < m • ) and the set S * such that, too many Þrms decide to become multi-plant (over-investment in plants, m * > m • ). + cN ) (b − 3cN ) ] .
In the remaining cases, there exists values of ξf associated with underinvestment and other values associated with over-investment. More precisely, the sets S * and S * are non empty, contiguous, bounded and such that the elements of S * are smaller than those of S * .
Proof. When size asymmetries are large (θ < θ • < θ < 1), the comparison between the equilibrium and the Þrst-best allocation is readily established. Indeed, m * discontinuously drops to zero at ξf = A H , whereas m • continuously falls with ξf in the interval ξf ∈ [B H , B 1 ]. Hence, if A H < B H , there are too few multi-plant Þrms (under-investment) for all ξf ∈ S * = (A H , B 1 ) whereas S * = {∅}. If A H > B 1 , there are too many multi-plant Þrms (over-investment) for all ξf ∈ S * = (B H , A H ) whereas S * = {∅}. If B H < A H < B 1 , there are too few multi-plant Þrms for ξf ∈ S * = (B H , A H ) and too many for ξf ∈ S * = (A H , B 1 ).
When size asymmetries are small (1/2 < θ < θ < θ • ), the comparison between equilibrium and Þrst-best can easily be performed by noting that the mass of multi-plant Þrms is more sensitive to the level of Þxed cost of a second plant in equilibrium than in the Þrst-best. Stated differently, in any conÞguration, m * decreases faster than m • (∂m * /∂(ξf) < ∂m • /∂(ξf) < 0). Since A 0 < B 0 , we need to check the case where A H ≤ B H and where A H > B H . First, if A H ≤ B H , we get S * = (A H , B 0 ) and S * = {∅}. Second, if A H > B H , then, as shown by Figure 6 , there exists B 0 such that S * = (B H , B 0 ) and S * = (B 0 , B 0 ). It is easy to show that the same comparison holds using B 1 in place of B 0 when 1/2 < θ < θ < θ
• .
The intuition underlying Proposition 1, as depicted by Figure 6 , is as follows.
INSERT FIGURE 6
First, under-investment in plants is due to a negative pecuniary externality. Indeed, when Þrms decide to become multi-plant they increase price competition, which beneÞts consumers. Yet, increasing competition hurts Þrms, which may lead them to adopt an export structure when trade costs are low and Þxed costs are high, even if the resulting fall in consumer surplus is larger than Þrms' proÞt gain. Stated differently, prices may be too low to support the socially optimal number of multi-plant Þrms. Second, overinvestment occurs for large transport costs and small Þxed costs of a second plant. In an equilibrium with single-plant Þrms only, single-plant Þrms set high prices when transport costs are large; in other words, single-plant Þrms tend to use trade barriers to push prices up. However, high prices also strongly entice Þrms to build a second plant in the foreign market. Indeed, one can show that a higher price in a country raise the sales revenue in that country faster if a Þrm builds a plant in that location than if it exports to it. Hence, when trade barriers are high enough, the incentives to invest in a second plant are large and over-investment may occur. Over-investment thus stems from a positive pecuniary externality between single-and multiplant Þrms, which seems unnoticed until now in the literature. Note that such a result does not show up in the models building on the CES speciÞca-tion, in which there is always under-investment and too few multinationals in equilibrium (see, e.g., Toulemonde, 2004 ). This suggests that variable mark-ups and pro-competitive effects play an important role in explaining the presence of over-investment.
Finally, one should also note that since trade costs seem to be quite low nowadays, under-investment could be more likely to occur than overinvestment. This suggests that the fears of too many multinationals operating in the global economy may be misplaced. 8 The above discussion so far focuses on the organizational inefficiencies only. We now turn to the locational inefficiencies. To do so, let us deÞne excess agglomeration as the larger country hosting too many plants in equilibrium compared to the Þrst best allocation, i.e., λ *
Consider Þrst the case of Ottaviano and Thisse (2004) where there exists only single-plant Þrms (m = 0). Then, λ *
H is simply equivalent to n * H > n • H , which always holds (this can be readily veriÞed using the expression of n • H given in Appendix B). Therefore, excess agglomeration takes place in singleplant conÞgurations, for instance, when costs of second plants are large or transport costs are small.
In the presence of multi-plant Þrms, under-agglomeration may occur in the sense that too few plants are located in the larger country. Consider the simple case where A H > B H and where ξf exceeds only slightly B H . We then get n * H = n * F = n • F = 0 < n • H , which implies that λ * H = 1/2 and that λ
Therefore, in equilibrium the larger country hosts fewer plants than in the Þrst-best so that under-agglomeration occurs.
INSERT FIGURE 7
As shown by Figure 7 , when ξf increases the economy goes through two distinct phases. First, there is over-investment in multi-plant Þrms when Þxed costs are low whereas trade costs are sufficiently high; and then there is under-investment as Þxed costs increase. From a spatial perspective, this leads to a Þrst conÞguration in which there is insufficient spatial polarization, whereas there is too much polarization in the other conÞguration. Let us summarize our Þndings as follows.
Proposition 2 When Þrms are constrained to run a single plant only, the larger country always hosts too many plants compared to the Þrst-best. In the presence of multi-plant Þrms, the larger country hosts too many plants compared with the Þrst-best when Þxed costs are sufficiently low, whereas it hosts too few plants when Þxed costs are sufficiently large.
Note, Þnally, that a reverse HME arises when Þxed costs are sufficiently low. In that case, country H's share of plants actually falls below its expenditure share θ, which is depicted by the dashed line in Figure 7 . As Þxed costs increase, the HME then progressively kicks-in for the equilibrium distribution and the Þrst-best.
Inelastic capital supply and crowding out
Until now, we have assumed that additional capital can be raised perfectly elastically at a constant unit cost r i = 1 on the world market so that the masses of Þrms and varieties are Þxed. Although analytically convenient, this assumption neglects the fact that entry plays an important role in the markets with differentiated products, and that the price of capital is endogenous and, therefore, may differ across countries and inßuence the spatial and organizational allocation of Þrms.
In this section, we analyze the implications of a less than perfectly elastic supply of capital which imply variable masses of Þrms and varieties. To keep things simple, we assume that the economy includes only a single industry, the one considered in this model. Capital is inelastic supplied and equal to the sum K of individuals' endowments (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004 ). The capital market clears when
Plugging (18) into expression (3), we readily get
Since N is the mass of available varieties, expression (19) concisely highlights the presence of a crowding out effect: the mass of varieties decreases with the mass of multinationals, since they require more capital but do not add more product variety. When there are only multinationals, the global economy hosts N = K/(f(1 + ξ)) Þrms, whereas it hosts N = K/f Þrms when there are only exporters. In this respect, our model differs from standard NEG models, in which the mass of Þrms is usually Þxed (e.g., Krugman, 1991;
Let r H , r F and r m denote the (endogenously determined) rental rates of capital for single-plant Þrms in countries H and F , and for multi-plant Þrms, respectively. Perfect capital mobility and free entry of Þrms in the differentiated industry imply that the return to capital absorbs all operating proÞts in equilibrium. Hence, the rental rate of capital is given by
in country H, with a symmetric expression holding for country F . The rental rate for a multi-plant Þrm is simply equal to
Under a global and perfectly integrated capital market, each individual allocates her capital to the project with the highest rate of return. Focusing on interior solutions only, where both countries host some Þrms, there is a unique equilibrium rental rate r * = max {r H , r F , r m }. The spatial and organizational allocation of capital equalizes the rental rates capital can fetch in the two countries. It is readily veriÞed that
a symmetric expression holding for r * F − r * m . Figure 8 depicts the loci where the previous two conditions hold with equality in (p * HH , p * F F )-space.
INSERT FIGURE 8
The qualitative analysis is similar to the one developed in the previous sections, albeit more complex. Since θ ≥ 1/2, single-plant Þrms locate in country H, whenever they exist, so that only the following four equilibria may arise: (i) Pure multi-plant when r * m > r * H and r * m > r * F , which corresponds to the area m in Figure 8 ; (ii) pure single-plant in H when r * H > r * m and r * H > r * F , which corresponds to the area H in Figure 7 ; (iii) mixedplant with single-plant agglomeration when r * H = r * m and r * H > r * F , which correspond to the border between areas m and H in Figure 8 ; and (iv) mixed-plant with partial single-plant agglomeration when r * H = r * F = r * m , corresponding to the point S at the border of the areas m, H and F in Figure 7 .
Concerning the Þrst-best, the government's objective is still given by expression (15) , adding simply the new constraint (19) . Hence, we may solve this problem in the same way as before.
The general analysis with a variable mass of Þrms is unfortunately quite cumbersome. Yet, numerical simulations reveal the following. First, the comparative static results are similar to the ones derived before. Larger demand (a or L), higher trade costs τ and lower costs for a second plant ξ all favor the emergence of multi-plant Þrms in equilibrium. Second, our main results, namely the existence of over-investment and under-agglomeration, continue to hold in this setting. To see this, assume that α = 1, β = 1, γ = 0.8, L = 10, K = 10, θ = 0.5, ξ = 0.55, τ = 0.07 and f = 1. Because countries are of equal size, n * H = n * F will hold at any equilibrium. It is readily veriÞed that this set of parameter values yields a pure multi-plant equilibrium: n * H = n * F = 0 and m * = 6.452. The rental rate of capital is r * m = 0.04172, which is higher than the returns to a (hypothetical) singleplant Þrm in either country.
Turing to the Þrst-best allocation it is given by a mix of single-and multi-plant Þrms: n • H = n • F = 1.454 and m • = 4.575. Several remarks are in order. First, the market outcome clearly yields over-investment, since the welfare maximizing planner would reduce the mass of multinationals and run a bunch of single-plant Þrms in each country. By doing so, the mass of available varieties increases from N * = 6.452 to N • = 7.484, thereby raising consumer surplus via the variety effect.
Since we assumed that θ = 1/2, the previous example does not reveal the case of under-agglomeration. Assume now that the new set of parameter values is as follows: α = 1, β = 1, γ = 0.77, L = 10, K = 10, θ = 0.51, ξ = 0.25, τ = 0.065 and f = 1. It is readily veriÞed that there is again a pure multi-plant equilibrium: n * H = n * F = 0 and m * = 8. The Þrst-best allocation is again given by a mix of single-and multi-plant Þrms: n • H = 0.115, n • F = 0.094 and m • = 7.832. Using expression (17), we have λ * = 0.5 whereas λ
• > 0.5, which reveals the presence of under-agglomeration in equilibrium.
Conclusion
We have developed a fully solvable model of horizontal FDI in which Þrms endogenously choose both their location and their production structure. Our Þndings conÞrm those of the existing literature, namely that Þrms will operate multiple production plants when Þxed costs are sufficiently low and/or when transport costs are high. Yet, we have also shown that price competition matters in shaping Þrms' decisions. Indeed, when more Þrms 'go multinational', price competition erodes the ability of exporting Þrms to proÞtably penetrate the foreign markets, thereby enticing them to become themselves multinational. As shown by the welfare analysis, this may then lead to situations in which too many multinationals operate in the global economy, thereby leading to an excessive waste of resources. This Þnding is opposed to those derived in the CES model, in which there is always a suboptimally low mass of multi-plant Þrms in equilibrium due to the absence of pro-competitive effects (Toulemonde, 2004) . We have also shown that the occurrence of excess-agglomeration strongly depends on whether multi-plant operation is allowed in the economy or not. Indeed, when all Þrms are single-plant, there will be excessive agglomeration in equilibrium, whereas the reverse may be true in the presence of multinationals. This suggests that the general perception that modern economies are over-agglomerated may require some drastic qualiÞcations, given that multi-plant operation is the rule and not the exception in the real world.
Appendix A: Spatial equilibrium
In this appendix, we derive the spatial equilibrium as a function of ξf. First we consider the case with small size asymmetries θ ≤ θ. Given the thresholds A H < A F < A 0 , we get the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (equilibrium with small size asymmetry) Assume that size asymmetries are sufficiently small, i.e., θ < θ. Then, (1a) if ξf < A H < A F , there is a pure multi-plant equilibrium such that n H = n F = 0 and m = N;
Proof. The following cases need to be distinguished:
(i) Assume that ξf < A H . This leads to a pure multi-plant equilibrium m = N, n H = 0 and n F = 0, because n H < 0 and n F < 0. Conditions (12) and (13) then show that Π m > Π s H and Π m > Π s F for all values of n H and n F , hence also for n H = n F = 0 and m = N.
(ii) Assume that A H < ξf < A F , so that n F < 0 < n H . Clearly, n F = 0 must hold in all cases. If n H < n H , then n H = N and m = 0. This is only feasible when N < n H , which will be the case when
which is false. The case n H > n H cannot arise, since in that case n H = 0, which is impossible since n H > 0. We Þnally have the case n H = n H , n F = 0 and m = N − n H , which is possible if and only if n H ≤ N. This holds provided that
which holds by assumption in this case.
(iii) Assume that A F < ξf < A 0 , so that 0 < n F < n H . Note that the cases n H ≥ n H and n F > n F (resp. n H > n H and n F ≥ n F ) are impossible, since they would imply that n F = 0 (resp. n H = 0). Analogously, the two cases n H < n H and n F ≥ n F (resp. n H ≥ n H and n F < n F ) can be ruled out for similar reasons, since they imply that n F = 0 (resp. n H = 0). Assume next that n F < n F and n H < n H . When this is true, Π m < Π s H and Π m < Π s F so that m = 0. When Π s H = Π s F , we get an interior solution provided that ξf > A 0 , which does not hold in this case by assumption. Thus, the only remaining possibility is a corner solution with n H = N, which is feasible when n H > N, i.e., when condition (22) holds. Similarly, when n F ≤ n F and n H > n H , we have n F = N. It is readily veriÞed that n F > N must then hold, which requires that
which does not hold in this case. Finally, assume that n H = n H and n F = n F , with m = N − n H − n F . This is feasible if and only if m ≥ 0, which requires that ξf < A 0 and, therefore, holds.
(iv) Assume, Þnally, that A 0 < ξf, so that n F < n H < 0. In this case, we have a pure single-plant equilibrium (n * H , n * F ) as derived in Section 3. This will be an interior equilibrium if and only if n * H < N and it will be a corner equilibrium n * H = N and n * F = 0 otherwise. For this to be feasible, we have to compare n * H with n H (resp. n * F with n F ). One can readily verify that
and that n * F < n F holds under the same condition. When (24) is satisÞed, no Þrm in any country has an incentive to build a second plant, so that a pure single-plant equilibrium (n * H , n * F ) can be sustained. Consider next the case with large size asymmetries θ > θ. Given the thresholds A H < A 0 < A F , we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (equilibrium with large size asymmetry) Assume that size asymmetries are sufficiently large, i.e., θ > θ. Then, (2a) if ξf < A H < A F , there is a pure multi-plant equilibrium such that n H = n F = 0 and m = N; (2b) if A H < ξf, there is a pure single-plant equilibrium with full agglomeration n H = N, n F = 0 and m = 0.
(i) If ξf < A H we have a pure multi-plant equilibrium for the same reason as in (A.1.) above.
(ii) If A H < ξf < A F , we know that n F < 0 < n H . Using the same argument as in (A.1.) above, we then get n H = N and m = n F = 0. This is because N < n H , which must be true since (22) holds in this case.
(iii) Finally, when A F < ξf, we have a pure single-plant equilibrium (n * H , n * F ) as in (A.1.) above. Since θ > θ, it is then readily veriÞed that n * H = N and n * F = 0.
Appendix B: Optimum
In this appendix, we derive the different conÞgurations for the Þrst best. The planner's problem is given by:
where S H is given by (16) . Concerning the global ranking of all four thresholds, we need to distinguish the following two cases: (i) θ ≤ θ • ; and (ii) θ > θ
• . One can check that in case (i) the global ranking is as follows: B H < B F < B 0 < B 1 ; whereas in case (ii) the global ranking satisÞes B H < B 1 < B 0 < B F .
Proposition 5 (optimum outcome) Suppose that the size asymmetries are sufficiently small, i.e., θ < θ
• . Then we have which, when compared with (14) shows that the planner will choose less agglomeration than the market outcome. Hence, the market outcome in the pure single-plant case yields too much agglomeration. 
